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Unresolved Questions regarding lawyers’ Fees and the 
restriction of Competition*
Fabio Ferraro**
aBStraCt: This paper explores the most salient aspects of the case-law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union on legal services in order to highlight a lack of clarity 
in defining the terms of compatibility between European Union law and national rules 
on lawyers’ fees. This is a complex issue and one that has not yet been finally resolved, 
especially in a difficult context such as that of the italian market, which is character-
ised by an extremely large number of lawyers, which in itself entails the risk of dete-
rioration in the quality of services provided, with services being offered at a discount. 
in italy, following the Cipolla judgment of the ECJ and the resulting abolition of the 
system of fixed remuneration (minimum and maximum fees), new measures were 
introduced by the State and professional organisations to protect members of the legal 
profession  (particularly to safeguard lawyers  in a weaker position in dealings with 
powerful clients such as banks and insurance companies) and to ensure fair remuner-
ation. in accordance with the Wouters exemption and the increasing role of economic 
analysis in competition rules, these measures require a reflective analytical approach 
in order to evaluate their compatibility with European Union law. 
KEYWordS: lawyers’ fees, fair remuneration, professional organisation, Wouters 
exemption, italian market.
1. Introduction
as is widely known, the European Commission is intending to remove 
or modify intrusive and restrictive regulation of the liberal professions 
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in order to foster competition among professionals and to increase alter-
natives for consumers in terms of price and quality. General reform of 
restrictive rules in the professional services sector was initiated in 2003 
with the publication of a study commissioned by the director-General for 
Competition into the economic impact of the regulation of the professions 
in the various Member States.1
This economic study was based on an in-depth comparison of the leg-
islation, regulations and codes of conduct governing access to the profes-
sions and the provision of professional services in the European Union. 
The conclusion reached in the study was that, in those Member States in 
which such professional services are regulated restrictively and excessively, 
the outcome from the point of view of the overall economy is less than 
optimal.
Following on from the considerations set out in the economic study, the 
European Commission invited regulatory authorities in the Member States 
and professional bodies to review existing rules, considering whether those 
rules were necessary in the public interest, whether they were proportion-
ate and whether they were justified.2
in this context, the Commission has undertaken many initiatives in 
the field of legal services with the aim of promoting competition and, in 
particular, protecting the freedom of lawyers to determine independently 
the fees they charge for their professional services. in the opinion of the 
Commission, the elimination of fee scales, whatever their nature (fixed 
or recommended, adopted by Member States or by professional bodies), 
not only increases price competition and client choice, but may also lead 
1 iain Paterson, Marcel Fink, anthony ogus, et al., Economic impact of regulation in the field of lib-
eral professions in different Member States, Study for the European Commission, dG Competition, 
institute for advances Studies, Vienna, January 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
pubblications /pubblications / #liberal.
2 Communication from the Commission – Report on Competition in Professional Services, 9 
February 2004, CoM/2004/0083 final; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
regions, Professional Services – Scope for More Reform – Follow-Up to the Report on Competition 
in Professional Services, 5 September 2005, CoM/2005/0405 final; Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the regions, On Reform Recommendations for Regulation in 
Professional Services, 10 January 2017, CoM/2016/820 final. See Mario Siragusa, “Critical remarks 
on the Commission’s legal analysis in its report on Competition in Professional Services”, in 
European Competition Law Annual 2004: The Relationship between Competition Law and the 
(Liberal) Professions, ed. Claus-dieter Ehlermann and isabela atanasiu  (oxford, 2006), 583.
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to improvements in dynamic efficiency and innovation in the markets for 
legal services. Nevertheless, lawyers’ associations and professionals have 
been very critical of the abolition of mandatory fee systems, arguing that 
the safeguarding of freedom of competition conflicts with the values of 
quality and independence in the legal profession.3 The tension between 
these two standpoints is reflected in the case-law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union dealing with the question of whether the fixing of 
lawyers’ fees is consistent with the rules of competition law and the free-
dom to provide services.4
in principle, a regulatory instrument fixing legal fees is by nature likely 
to have a detrimental effect on competition. in practice, however, it is a 
complex issue and one that has not yet been finally resolved. That is espe-
cially true in the difficult context of the italian market, which is character-
ised by an extremely large number of lawyers, which in itself entails a risk 
of deterioration in the quality of the services provided, with services being 
offered at a discount.
The case-law of the Court of Justice reveals a lack of clarity in defin-
ing the terms of compatibility between European Union law and national 
rules on lawyers’ fees. This article analyses in detail this case-law and then 
assesses the solutions adopted in the italian legal system and their compat-
ibility with European Union law.
3 in that context, as pointed out by advocate General léger in his opinion in Wouters and Others 
(delivered on 10 July 2001, C-309/99, EU:C:2001:390, paragraph 174), “lawyers occupy a central 
position in the administration of justice as intermediaries between the public and the courts”.
4 See, inter alia, Claus-dieter Ehlermann, “Concurrence et profession libérales: antagonisme ou 
compatibilitè?”, Revue Marché Commun, 1993, 139; Bruno Nascimbene, “tariffe professionali e 
norme sulla concorrenza fra giudice comunitario e giudice nazionale”, Contratto impresa/europa, 
1997, 482; Harold Nyssens, “Concurrence et ordre professionnels; les trompettes de Jéricho son-
nent-elles? ”, Revue de Droit Commercial Belge, 1999, 475; Stefano Bastianon, “due pronunce, 
tanti problemi, nessuna soluzione: ovvero gli avvocati e l’antitrust secondo la Corte di giustizia”, 
Il Foro. It., 2002, iV, 188; Giuseppe Scassellati Sforzolini and Cesare rizza, ‘“la tensione fra regole 
di concorrenza comunitarie e regole professionali e deontologiche nazionali”, Giurisprudenza 
commerciale, 2003, 8; Fabio Ferraro, L’Avvocato Comunitario, Naples, 2005, 143; Edith loozen, 
“Professional ethics and restraints of competition”, European Law Review, 2006, 28; ida E. Wendt, 
EU Competition Law and Liberal Professions: An Uneasy Relationship?, leiden: Martinus Niijoff 
Publishers, 2012.
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2. Competition rules and minimum fees
The professions do not escape the application of the rules of competition 
law,5 the activities pursued in the professions being assimilated to the 
European Union law concept of “undertakings”6 and the governing bodies 
of the various professions being likened to “associations of undertakings”.7
in particular, a lawyers’ activity consists in offering legal services on 
a given market against remuneration, and that is enough to qualify that 
activity as an economic activity and, therefore, as an undertaking.8 The 
fact that the benefit is of an intellectual, technical or specialised nature and 
is provided on a personal and direct basis does not alter the nature of the 
economic activity of the profession.
This means that antitrust rules apply to professionals, as well as to pro-
fessional bodies,9 and these include the prohibition of restriction of com-
petition, the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position and the various 
other competition rules laid down in the FEU treaty.10 Even mere recom-
mendations issued by professional governing bodies may be contrary to 
5 See the judgment of 18 June 1998, Commission v. Italian Republic, C-35/96, EU:C:1998:303; the 
judgment of 30 March 2000, Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v. Commission, 
t-513/93, EU:t:2000:91; the judgment of 28 March 2001, Institute of Professional Representatives 
before the European Patent Office v. Commission, t-144/99, EU:t:2001:105. 
6 in accordance with settled case-law, in the context of competition law, the concept of an under-
taking covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way 
in which it is financed (see, inter alia, judgment of 23 april 1991, K. Hofner and F. Elser v. Macroton 
GmbH, C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161, paragraph 21). it is a notion distinct from national concepts and 
only functional to the application of competition rules. Therefore, the professional is not subject to 
the national rules for business and enterprise and may not become insolvent or bankrupt.
7 Judgment of 19 February 2002, Wouters, C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraph 64.  
8 Judgment of 19 February 2002, Wouters, C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraphs 47-49.
9 it is irrelevant whether the professional body enjoys public-law status as long as it regulates the 
economic behaviour of its members and does not carry out typical governmental prerogatives 
or social tasks based on the principle of solidarity. See the judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio 
Nazionale dei Geologi, C-136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 44.
10 The issue of the applicability to the legal profession of antitrust law was first, and most amply 
discussed in the United States, in the well-known Goldfarb judgment (Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar 421 U.S. 773, 1975). This is the leading case on the question of the applicability of the Sherman 
Act, the federal antitrust law, to the legal profession. The Supreme Court confirmed for the first 
time the principle that the liberal professions should be likened to a “trade or commerce” and found 
to be incompatible with the Sherman Act the bar’s practice of fixing mandatory minimum rates for 
professional services, precluding the applicability of the State action defence.
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article 101 tFEU, in so far as they tend to standardise the conduct of pro-
fessionals on the market.11
in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the tFEU treaty 
rules on competition do not apply to any activity which, by its nature, its 
aim and the rules to which it is subject, does not belong to the sphere of 
economic activity, or which is connected with the exercise of the powers of 
a public authority.12 it should be noted that generally speaking – and in any 
event in all of the cases examined by the Court of Justice – rules on lawyers’ 
fees cannot be regarded as not belonging to the sphere of economic activ-
ity. Furthermore, when assessing the effects of a decision of an association 
of undertakings in the light of article 101 tFEU it is necessary to take into 
consideration the actual context in which it is situated, in particular the 
economic and legal context in which the undertakings concerned operate, 
the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions 
of the functioning and structure of the market or markets in question.13
in addition, articles 101 tFEU and 102 tFEU, read in conjunction with 
article 4(3) tEU, require Member States not to introduce or maintain in 
force measures, even those of a legislative or regulatory nature, which may 
render ineffective the competition rules that apply to undertakings.14
However, the Commission acknowledges that some regulation in this 
sector is justified. That is for three reasons: the asymmetry of information 
as between consumer and service provider,15 the concept of externality16 
11 European Commission, decision CoMP/a.38549 of 24 June 2004, Belgian Architects’ 
Association, oJ 2005 l 48, p. 10. The European Commission found that the fee scale was neither 
necessary nor proportionate in order to guarantee the proper practice of the profession, dis-
couraging architects from working in a cost-efficient manner. See, in this regard, Edith loozen, 
“Professional ethics and restraints of competition”, 33.
12 Judgment of 30 January 1985, BNIC v. Clair, 123/83, EU:C:1985:33, paragraph 17.
13 See, inter alia, the judgment of 28 February 2013, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas, C-1/12, 
EU:C:2013:127, paragraph 70.
14 in particular, as is well-known, article 101 tFEU, read in conjunction with article 4(3) tEU, is 
infringed where a Member State requires or encourages the adoption of agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices contrary to article 101 tFEU or reinforces their effects, or where it divests its 
own rules of the character of legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsibility 
for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere (judgment of 21 September 2016, Établissements 
Fr. Colruyt, C-221/15, EU:C:2016:704, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
15 an essential feature of professional services is that operators must have a high level of technical 
knowledge. Consumers, who may not have such knowledge, therefore have difficulty in judging 
the quality of the services they purchase.
16 in some markets, the provision of a service may have an impact on third parties as well as on the 
buyer of the service.
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and the concept of public goods.17 in particular, the application of antitrust 
rules to the professions should be integrated with the so-called “Wouters 
exception” (from the ECJ case of the same name), whereby certain restric-
tions of competition are necessary for the proper exercise of the profession, 
in accordance with the organisational arrangements of the Member State 
concerned.18 This exception introduces into the analysis of the applicabil-
ity to the professions of the rules of competition law public interest consid-
erations relating to the need to lay down rules on organisation, qualifica-
tion, professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure that 
the ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound administration of 
justice are protected by the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity 
and experience.19
it is worth pointing out that, to date, the Court of Justice has not ruled 
on the issue of whether lawyers and/or associations of lawyers may be 
regarded as undertakings entrusted with the operation of a service of gen-
eral economic interest, within the meaning of article 106(2) tFEU, as sug-
gested by advocate General léger.20 
Having said that, it is interesting to examine the judgments in Arduino,21 
Cipolla and Others,22 CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria, 23 National Association of 
17 Some professional services are intended to produce public goods that have a value for society in 
general. in the absence of regulation, there is a risk that some professional services markets supply 
insufficient or inadequate public goods.
18 in judgment of 19 February 2002, Wouters, C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraph 107, the Court 
of Justice acknowledged that “the 1993 regulation could (...) reasonably be considered to be neces-
sary in order to ensure the proper practice of the legal profession, as it is organised in the Member 
State concerned”.
19 See adrian J. Vossestein, “Case C-35/99, arduino, Judgment of 19 February 2000, Full Court; 
Case C-309/99,  Wouters et al.  v.  algemene raad van de Nederlandse orde van advocaten, 
Judgment of 19 February 2002, Full Court”; Common Market Law Review, 2002, 841; rosemary 
o’loughlin, “EC competition rules and free movement rules: an examination of the parallels 
and their furtherance by the ECJ Wouters decision”, European Competition Law Review, 2003, 62; 
Pietro Manzini, “i parafernali del giudizio antitrust: regola della ragionevolezza, restrizioni acces-
sorie, divieto ‘per se”’, Giurisprudenza Commerciale, 2003, ii, 285; Hans Gilliams, “Competition 
law and public interest: do we need to change the law for the (liberal) professions?”, in European 
Competition Law Annual 2004: The Relationship between Competition Law and the (Liberal) 
Professions, ed. Claus-dieter Ehlermann and isabela atanasiu (oxford: Hart, 2006), 295.
20 opinion of 10 July 2001, C-309/99, Wouters, EU:C:2001:390, paragraph 172.
21 Judgment of 19 February 2002, Arduino, C-35/99, EU:C:2002:97.
22 Judgment of 5 december 2006, Cipolla and Others, C-94/04 and C-202/04, EU:C:2006:758.
23 Judgment of 23 November 2017, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria AD, C-427/16 and C-428/16, 
EU:C:2017:890.
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Geologists 24 and Eurosaneamientos,25 in which the Court considered the 
compliance of mandatory fee rates with competition law and with the 
freedom to provide services, without taking into account the issue of 
contingency fee agreements.26 The solutions which the Court arrived at 
are not entirely convincing and reflect a more cautious attitude than the 
Commission’s deregulatory stance.
The first of these cases concerned the consistency with articles 10 EC 
and 81 EC (articles 4(3) tEU and 101 tFEU) of an italian regulation on 
the italian mandatory fee scheme. The Court was asked to rule on whether 
the abovementioned provisions precluded the adoption by a Member State 
of a regulation that approved, on the basis of a draft drawn up by a profes-
sional body such as a national professional association of lawyers, a mini-
mum fixed fee for lawyers. it was necessary for the Court to assess whether 
articles 10 EC and 81 EC had been infringed by reference to the case-law 
according to which such an infringement occurs where a Member State 
requires or encourages the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted 
practices contrary to article 81 EC or reinforces their effects, or where it 
divests its own rules of the character of legislation by delegating to private 
economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting the eco-
nomic sphere.27
in his opinion in this case, advocate General léger arrived at a differ-
ent, interesting and innovative solution for assessing the measures adopted 
by the italian State in the light of article 81 EC, read together with article 
10 EC.28
in short, the advocate General recognised that such a restrictive mea-
sure did indeed infringe articles 10 EC and 81 EC, except if (1) the public 
authorities of the Member State exercised effective control over the con-
tent of the agreement, decision or concerted practice; (2) the State measure 
pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest, and (3) the State measure 
was proportional to the aim pursued.
24 Judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C-136/12, EU:C:2013:489.
25 Judgment of 8 december 2016, Eurosaneamientos and Others, C-532/15 and C-538/15, 
EU:C:2016:932.
26 See the opinion of 1 February 2006, Cipolla and Others, C-94/04 and C-202/04, EU:C:2006:76, 
paragraph 94.
27 order of the Court of Justice of 17 February 2005, C-250/03, Mauri, EU:C:2005:96, paragraph 30; 
see also the judgment of 21 September 2016, Établissements Fr. Colruyt, C-221/15, EU:C:2016:704, 
paragraph 44 and the case-law cited.
28 opinion of 10 July 2001, Arduino, C35/99, EU:C:2001:389.
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in its judgment, the Court did not follow that reading of “State mea-
sures”, which has since emerged progressively in the subsequent case-law 
of the Court of Justice, and instead concluded that the italian State had 
not waived its powers by delegating to private economic operators respon-
sibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere; nor had it 
“encourage[d] the adoption [by the italian bar] of agreements, decisions 
or concerted practices contrary to article [81 EC] or reinforce[d] their 
effects”.29
The Court in luxembourg arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the 
following considerations: (1) the Consiglio Nazionale Forense (National 
Bar Council) was responsible only for producing a draft fee scale which 
was not binding as such, inasmuch as, without the Minister of Justice’s 
approval, the draft scale would not enter into force and the earlier approved 
scale would remain applicable; (2) the Minister was assisted by two pub-
lic bodies, the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) and the CiP (inter-
ministerial Committee on Prices), whose opinions he must obtain before 
the scale could be approved; and (3) the national courts had a wide discre-
tion in the application of the fees.
in effect, what the ECJ found most worthy of attention in this case was 
the fact that the ministerial act that approved the fees did not, in real terms, 
constitute a mere ratification of the autonomous decision of the National 
Bar Council.
The judgment in Cipolla and Others offers little guidance on the issue of 
consistency with EU competition law, since it merely repeats the principle 
expressed in Arduino concerning the validity of mandatory fee systems, 
which will be valid if they are subject to real State control.30
29 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 February 2002, C-35/99, Arduino, EU:C:2002:97, para-
graph 43. See Mario Monti, “Competition in professional services: New lights and new challenges”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_070_en.pdf. 
30 See, inter alia, Marco amorese, “Cases C-94/04, Cipola & Macrino: the emergence of a political 
approach to the regulation of professionals in Europe?”, The Columbia Journal of European Law, 
2007,733; Martin illmer,  “lawyers’ fees and access to justice – the Cipolla and Macrino judgment 
of the ECJ (Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04)”, Civil Justice Quarterly, 2007, 301; Michael J. 
Frese, Herman J. van Harten, “How extravagant the fees of counsellors at law sometimes appear, 
competition law and internal market constraints to fixed remuneration schemes”, Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration, 2007, 393; Juliana rodríguez rodrigo, “aplicación del derecho de la com-
petencia a los baremos de honorarios de abogados: arduino y Cipolla”, in La Unión Europea ante 
el Derecho de la Globalización, coord. alfonso luis Calvo Caravaca, Esperanza Castellanos ruiz 
(ColEX, 2008), 433.
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2.1. The CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria judgment
as far as competition law is concerned, in its recent judgment in CHEZ 
Elektro Bulgaria, the Court reached a different conclusion from those of its 
previous judgments on minimum fee rates.
Before considering those conclusions, however, it is useful to recall that 
the Court of Justice first addressed certain questions relating to the rela-
tionship between the State and professional organisations for the purposes 
of the application of the rules of competition law, emphasising principles 
already set out in its earlier case-law and providing further clarification.
in particular, the ECJ emphasised that a Member State does not under-
mine the rules of competition law applicable to undertakings, in accord-
ance with article 101 tFEU and article 4(3) tEU, where “tariffs are fixed 
with due regard for the public-interest criteria defined by law and the pub-
lic authorities do not delegate their rights and powers to private economic 
operators even if representatives of the economic operators are not in the 
minority on the committee proposing those tariffs”.31 The Court of Justice 
pointed out that the criteria for the general public interest “must be defined 
in law sufficiently precisely, there must be actual review and the State must 
have the power to adopt decisions in the last resort”.32
Nevertheless, the Court found that those conditions were not met in this 
case, “having regard to the lack of provisions capable of ensuring that the 
Supreme Council of the legal Profession [conducted] itself as an arm of 
the State working in the public interest subject to actual review and the 
power to adopt decisions in the last resort by the State”.33
31 Judgment of 23 November 2017, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria AD, C-427/16 and C-428/16, 
EU:C:2017:890, paragraph 43.
32 Judgment of 23 November 2017, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria AD, C-427/16 and C-428/16, 
EU:C:2017:890, paragraph 46. 
33 it should also be noted that the Court of Justice has confirmed that a tariff established by a pro-
fessional organisation may “have the character of legislation, inter alia, where the members of that 
organisation are experts who are independent of the economic operators concerned and they are 
required, under the law, to set tariffs taking into account not only the interests of the undertakings 
or associations of undertakings in the sector which has appointed them but also the public inter-
est and the interests of undertakings in other sectors or users of the services in question” (judg-
ment of 4 September 2014, API and Others, C-184/13 to C-187/13, C-194/13, C-195/13 and C208/13, 
EU:C:2014:2147, paragraph 34; judgment of 17 November 1993, Reiff, C-185/91, EU:C:1993:886, 
paragraphs 17 to 19 and 24; judgment of 9 June 1994, Delta Schiffahrts- und Speditionsgesellschaft, 
C-153/93, EU:C:1994:240, paragraphs 16 to 18 and 23; judgment of 17 october 1995 DIP and 
Others, C-140/94 to C-142/94, EU:C:1995:330, paragraphs 18 and 19).
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Proceeding on from its preliminary assessments, the Court of Justice 
criticised, with reference to article 101 tFEU, read together with article 
4(3) tEU, the Bulgarian legislation “which, first, [did] not allow a lawyer 
and his client to agree remuneration in an amount less than the minimum 
amount laid down in a regulation issued by a professional organisation of 
lawyers, such as the Supreme Council of the legal Profession, without that 
lawyer being subject to a disciplinary procedure, and, secondly, [did] not 
authorise the courts to order reimbursement of fees in an amount below 
that minimum amount”.34 The Court stated that the national legislation 
at issue seemed to contain no specific criterion ensuring that the mini-
mum amounts of lawyers’ remuneration, as determined by the Supreme 
Council of the legal Profession, were fair and justified in accordance with 
the general interest. The Court nevertheless left the question somewhat 
open-ended, stating that it was for the national court to decide whether 
the Wouters exception should be applied, that is to say, to assess “whether 
such legislation, in the light of the specific detailed rules for the application 
thereof, actually meets with legitimate objectives and whether the restric-
tions thus imposed are limited to what is necessary to ensure that those 
legitimate objectives are given effect”.35
Ultimately, from the antitrust viewpoint, this judgment is more com-
plete and exhaustive in its assessment of possible justifications for the 
introduction of minimum fee rates, albeit that the Court’s findings were 
essentially negative regarding the national rules laid down by the lawyers’ 
association and rendered mandatory by the State, which did not even allow 
the courts to order reimbursement of fees in an amount below the mini-
mum amount.36
34 Judgment of 23 November 2017, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria, C-427/16 and C-428/16, EU:C:2017:890, 
paragraph 40.
35 Judgment of 23 November 2017, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria, C-427/16 and C-428/16, EU:C:2017:890, 
paragraph 58. See also the judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C-136/12, 
EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 53.
36 The Court of Justice also ruled that “article 101(1) tFEU, read in conjunction with article 4(3) 
tEU and Council directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by 
lawyers of freedom to provide services, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation 
(...) by virtue of which individuals and sole traders obtain reimbursement of lawyers” remunera-
tion, ordered by a national court, if they have been defended by a legal adviser (judgment of 23 
November 2017, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria AD, C-427/16 and C428/16, EU:C:2017:890, paragraphs 
59-63). in this connection, the Court of Justice pointed out that “since directive 77/249 does not 
contain any provision governing the reimbursement, ordered by a court, of the remuneration of 
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2.2. The National association of Geologists judgment
Before the CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria judgment, the Court of Justice had, 
in fact, on several occasions addressed the issue of the complex relation-
ship between competition law and fixed remuneration, but with reference 
to other professions than the legal profession.37 in particular, it is worth 
briefly noting the National Association of Geologists judgment 38 in order 
to compare the solutions adopted by the Court of Justice with regard to 
lawyers with those it adopted with regard to a different profession, namely 
the profession of geologists.
in this judgment we find general principles analogous to those set out 
by the Court of Justice in the CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria judgment, with ref-
erence to both the definition of the professional bodies and the decisions 
they adopt, and the need to take the attainment of legitimate aims into 
consideration.
in this regard, the rules of professional conduct approved by the National 
association of Geologists, which establish the dignity of the profession as 
well as the quality and scale of the work to be performed as criteria for 
determining professional remuneration, constitute a decision by an asso-
ciation of undertakings within the meaning of article 101(1) tFEU which 
may have the effect of restricting competition within the internal market. 
despite the establishment of general principles, it is clear that, from an 
antitrust viewpoint, it is necessary to assess the national rules applicable to 
each profession on a case-by-case basis, referring to their objective, context 
and purpose. For this reason, the Court of Justice has deemed that rules of 
professional conduct relating to fees and professional dignity do not neces-
sarily breach the antitrust rules, in so far as it must be ascertained whether 
legitimate aims justifying the restriction of competition exist.
Hence, the Court was able to conclude that “it is for the referring court 
to assess, in the light of the overall context in which the Code of Conduct 
produces its effects, including the national legal framework in its entirety 
and the manner in which that code is applied in practice by the National 
providers of legal services, it must be held that that national legislation does not fall within the 
scope of directive 77/249” (paragraph 62 of the judgment).
37 See, for example, judgment of 18 June 1998, Commission v. Italian Republic, C-35/96, 
EU:C:1998:303.
38 Judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C-136/12, EU:C:2013:489. See 
Giuliano Scarselli, “il compenso professionale tra decoro e libera professione”, Foro Italiano, 2012, 
374, which compares the rules on the professional conduct of geologists with those applicable to 
lawyers.
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association of Geologists, whether that effect [of restricting competition] 
is produced in the present case”. Furthermore, the Court of Justice left it 
to the referring national court to “verify whether, in the light of all the 
relevant material before it, the rules of that code, in particular, in so far 
as they apply the criterion based on the dignity of the profession, may be 
regarded as necessary for the implementation of the legitimate objective of 
providing guarantees to consumers of geologists’ services”.39
in fact, in the CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria and National Association of 
Geologists judgments there is no clear rejection of rules of professional 
conduct which concern criteria for fixing fees, but what emerges is the 
need to coordinate free competition with professional dignity. However, 
in the Member States where compliance with these values is not required 
by the professional code of conduct or other rules, the parties will be free 
to determine the fees and/or it will be left to the national court to consider 
the aforementioned values.
Ultimately, the CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria and National Association of 
Geologists judgments appear to be in line with the latest ECJ case-law, 
which is moving towards raising the economic and social analysis in the 
evaluation of the real and potential impact of undertakings’ conduct on 
competition variables.40
3. Freedom to provide service and minimum fees
The real issue is not only to ascertain the correct procedure as regards the 
practices of the professional governing bodies and the role of the State in 
this area, but also to establish whether competition restrictions should 
exist and, if so, in relation to which specific activities. The CHEZ Elektro 
Bulgaria and National Association of Geologists judgments address the 
need to review the overall context in which the decision on minimum fee 
rates was adopted and, most importantly, whether the objectives pursued 
are fair and justified, with regard to the public interest.
in line with such substantive assessments is the second part of the judg-
ment in Cipolla in which the compatibility of the fee system with EU law 
on the free movement of service providers pursuant to article 56 tFEU 
(formerly article 49 tEC) is assessed.
39 Judgment of 18 July 2013, Consiglio Nazionale dei Geologi, C-136/12, EU:C:2013:489, paragraph 57.
40 Judgment of 11 September 2014, C-67/13 P, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v. European 
Commission, EU:C:2014:2204; judgment of 6 September 2017, C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. European 
Commission, EU:C:2017:632.
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it is of course debatable whether a mandatory fee system should be 
assessed by reference to the freedom to provide services. For one reason, 
fees are among the main levers of competition and they should therefore 
be assessed by reference to the relevant provisions of EU law. in actual fact, 
the Court of Justice has based assessments on a previous solution, one that 
concerns in particular the free movement of goods41, and has also been 
applied in connection with the free movement of service providers42 and 
freedom of establishment.43
as regards the freedom to provide services, the Cipolla judgment con-
tains contradictory arguments, some in favour of abolishing the system of 
fixed remuneration, others in favour of maintaining minimum fees.
The Court of Justice pointed out that the prohibition of derogation from 
the minimum fees made access to the italian legal services market more 
difficult for lawyers established in other Member States and, therefore, was 
likely to restrict the exercise of their activities providing services in that 
41 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 april 1984, Van de Haar, C-177/82, EU:C:1984:144. The 
Court started from the premises that “it is important to bear in mind the context in which those 
two provisions of the treaty are situated. article 85 of the treaty belongs to the rules on competi-
tion which are addressed to undertakings and which are intended to maintain effective competi-
tion in the common market. as the Court has held in previous judgments, that provision only 
comes into consideration with regard to agreements, decisions or practices restricting competition 
which appreciably affect intra-Community trade. article 30, on the other hand, belongs to the 
rules which seek to ensure the free movement of goods and, to that end, to eliminate measures 
taken by Member States which might in any way impede such free movement” (paragraphs 11 and 
12). it then concluded that “article 30 of the treaty, which seeks to eliminate national measures 
capable of hindering trade between Member States, pursues an aim different from that of article 
85, which seeks to maintain effective competition between undertakings” (paragraph 14). 
42 as far as, for example, the activity of transport consultant is concerned, it may be recalled 
that advocate General alber clearly stated (in his opinion of 8 March 2001, Commission v. Italy, 
C-263/99, EU:C:2001:141, paragraph 48) that “the provision relating to the setting of minimum 
fees (…) restricts the freedom to provide services. This is because it does not allow service pro-
viders to offer their services at a price which might make their services more attractive to the 
customer than those of another firm on the basis of cost”. However, the Court of Justice did not fol-
low the advocate General’s approach because “the Commission [had] not made clear how and to 
what extent a service provider, even if he is required to comply with minimum and maximum fees 
within the Member State in which he is established, is subject to restrictions [on] the freedom to 
provide services within the meaning of article 59 of the treaty by reason of the fact that, in another 
Member State, in which he pursues his activity temporarily or occasionally, he is likewise required 
to comply with similar fees” (judgment of the Court of Justice of 29 May 2001, Commission v. Italy, 
C-263/99, EU:C:2001:293, paragraph 26). 
43 Judgment of 5 october 2004, Caixa Bank France, C442/02, EU:C:2004:586, paragraph 13.
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Member State.44 Such a prohibition deprived foreign lawyers “of the pos-
sibility, by requesting fees lower than those set by the scale, of competing 
more effectively with lawyers established on a stable basis in the Member 
State concerned and who therefore had greater opportunities for winning 
clients than lawyers established abroad”.45
a further point which militates in favour of the view that mandatory 
fee systems conflict with the freedom of service providers is the fact that a 
fixed fee system may not in itself prevent members of the legal profession 
from offering services of an inferior nature.
That view is countered by the Court’s observation exceptionally justify-
ing a rigid system of fixed remuneration, stating that “it is conceivable that 
such a scale does serve to prevent lawyers, in a context such as that of the 
italian market which, as indicated in the decision making the reference, is 
characterised by an extremely large number of lawyers who are enrolled 
and practising, from being encouraged to compete against each other by 
possibly offering services at a discount, with the risk of deterioration in the 
quality of the services provided”.46 in effect, in the complex italian context 
it is not easy to balance diverse interests, since the free determination of fees 
may facilitate access to the market for younger lawyers and greater compe-
tition, but it may impede them and “weaker” professionals from obtaining 
a fair and dignified fee, if they have less contractual power vis-à-vis clients. 
However, more generally, the protection of consumers, in particular the 
recipients of legal services provided by persons concerned with the admin-
istration of justice, and the safeguarding of the proper administration of 
justice are objectives among those which may be regarded as overriding 
reasons relating to the public interest capable of justifying a restriction 
of the freedom to provide services, on condition, first, that the national 
measure at issue is appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and, 
secondly, that it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
that objective.47 The national court should determine whether education 
44 Judgment of 5 december 2006, Cipolla and Others, C-94/04 and C-202/04, EU:C:2006:758, para-
graph 58.
45 Judgment of 5 december 2006, Cipolla and Others, C-94/04 and C-202/04, EU:C:2006:758, para-
graph 59.
46 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 december 2006, Cipolla and Others, C-94/04 and C-202/04, 
EU:C:2006:758, paragraph 67.
47 See, in this regard, the judgment of 12 december 1996, Reisebüro Broede, C-3/95, EU:C:1996:487, 
paragraph 31 and the case-law cited, and the judgment of 21 September 1999, Läärä and Others, 
C-124/97, EU:C:1999:435, paragraph 33.
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requirements, rules of professional ethics and liability suffice in themselves 
to attain the objectives of consumer protection and the proper administra-
tion of justice. 
overall, the reasoning of the Court of Justice in favour of abolishing 
systems of fixed remuneration seems to prevail over its reasoning in favour 
of their maintenance.
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice did adopt a different solution in 
Eurosaneamientos,48 probably influenced by the Commission’s approach, 
which was that the restrictions were basically national restrictions and 
it would primarily be for the Member States, the national competition 
authorities and the professional bodies to bring them to an end.49
More specifically, the Court of Justice held that it did not have jurisdic-
tion to answer the questions concerning the compatibility of the rules on 
lawyers’ fees with the provisions of the FEU treaty on freedom to provide 
services in a situation which was confined in all respects within a single 
Member State. in other words, the case in point was a matter of an inter-
nal, domestic nature. it should be noted that the situation was no different 
from that at issue in Cipolla, in which the Court instead considered the 
minimum fees essentially to be inconsistent with the freedom to provide 
services.
incidentally, it may be noted that a provision which obliges lawyers to 
observe maximum fee rates does not constitute a restriction of the free-
dom to provide services or of the right of establishment within the mean-
ing of the EC treaty (now, the FEU treaty): the italian fee system here 
at issue was characterised by a flexibility which appeared to allow proper 
remuneration for all types of services provided by lawyers.50 it follows that, 
according to the Court of Justice, rules on lawyers’ maximum fee rates 
are not designed in such a way as to hinder access to the italian market 
for legal services under normal, effective conditions of competition. it is 
48 See Georges decocq, “la législation espagnole relative aux honoraires des avoués n’est pas con-
traire à la prohibition des ententes”, Revue de Jurisprudence Commerciale, 2017, 49.
49 in this regard, Council regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 december 2002 on the implementation 
of the rules on competition laid down in articles 81 and 82 of the treaty (oJ 2003 l 1, p. 1) empow-
ered the competition authorities and courts of the Member States to apply EU competition rules in 
full, including in the area of the professions. However, the European Commission considers that 
the fixed prices are probably the regulatory instrument likely to have the most detrimental effects 
on competition (Communication from the Commission – Report on Competition in Professional 
Services, 9 February 2004, CoM/2004/0083 final). 
50 Judgment of 29 March 2011, Commission v. Italy, C-565/08, EU:C:2011:188, paragraph 53.
M&Clr_ii_1.indd   89 26/04/2018   10:03:46
90  Market and Competition Law Review / volume ii / no. 1 / april 2018 / 75-97
debatable whether such assertions of principle in relation to maximum 
rates, and in particular the Court’s favourable assessment of their flex-
ibility, might also be applied to minimum rates. However, it must be borne 
in mind that maximum rates and minimum rates cannot be placed on the 
same footing, inasmuch as the primary purpose of the former is to protect 
clients from paying excessive fees, while the main objective of the latter is 
to safeguard the activities carried out by lawyers.51
4. The follow-up in Italy
in italy, the system of fixed remuneration (minimum and maximum rates) 
was abolished and new measures were introduced by the State and the 
professional governing body to protect professionals (in particular, law-
yers in a weaker position in dealings with powerful clients such as banks 
and insurance companies, as well as public authorities) and to ensure fair 
remuneration.52
When it abolished fixed rates, the italian State (the Ministry of Justice for 
the legal profession) replaced them with ministerial “parameters”, which 
nevertheless apply only where professional fees are liquidated by a judicial 
body.53 This means that courts may refer to the ministerial parameters, but 
that professionals may not use them in their agreements with clients, and 
if they do so the terms of remuneration agreed upon will be null and void.
These parameters therefore leave unresolved the issue of fair remunera-
tion, inasmuch as they are incapable of preventing unjust prevarication in 
dealings with younger, less powerful professionals.
Suffice it to recall, by way of example, the recognition by the Consiglio 
di Stato (Council of State) of the lawfulness of a call for tenders launched 
by the municipality of Catanzaro for the drafting of a structural plan and 
town-planning regulation, notwithstanding the stipulation of a contract 
51 The European Commission acknowledges that in some cases maximum fees might protect con-
sumers from excessive charges, but considers that a less restrictive mechanism (such as improved 
information on the services provided) could be put in place. See the Communication from the 
Commission – Report on Competition in Professional Services, 9 February 2004, CoM/2004/0083 
final.
52 decree-law No. 223 of 4 July 2006 (“the Bersani decree”, Official Journal of the Italian Republic, 
no. 153 of 4 July 2006), converted by law No. 248 of 4 august 2006 (Official Journal of the Italian 
Republic, no. 186 of 11 august 2006), abolished statutorily fixed and minimum attorneys’ fees.
53 See article 9 of decree law No. 1 of 24 January 2012 (Official Journal of the Italian Republic, no. 
19 of 24 January 2012), converted by law No. 27 of 24 March 2012 (Official Journal of the Italian 
Republic, no. 71 of 24 March 2012).
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value of one euro.54 The Council of State found that a public contracting 
authority was different from a private contracting authority and could 
offer its suppliers alternative forms of remuneration, not necessarily of an 
economic nature, because a financial profit was not regarded as an essen-
tial element under the current law of public contracts. a tenderer could, 
according to the decision, derive a benefit inasmuch as “the financial profit 
is displaced by legitimate non-material factors inherent in becoming, and 
being seen to be the contractor”.
it is difficult to sympathise with this part of the decision, since a lack of 
remuneration is inconsistent with article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental 
rights of the European Union, which is headed “Fair and just working 
conditions” and stipulates that every worker – without distinction between 
employed and self-employed workers – is entitled to dignified working 
conditions.
For those reasons, the legislature and the National Bar Council have 
sought solutions in order to avoid such damaging situations for profession-
als. in accordance with the Wouters exemption and the increasing role of 
economic analysis in the rules of competition law, the new measures also 
require a reflective analysis so that their consistency with European Union 
law may be assessed.
as far as the profession’s governing body is concerned, the italian 
Competition authority has sanctioned the National Bar Council on 
account of two agreements restricting competition, without considering 
in detail the Wouters exemption.55 The agreements consisted in:
1. the publication of ministerial tariffs – which had been abrogated 
– on the Council’s institutional website accompanied by a circular 
issued in 2006 stating that lawyers who charge rates below the mini-
mum rate may be sanctioned on the basis of the profession’s code of 
conduct;
2. opinion No. 48/2012 of the Council stating that the use of websites, 
on behalf of lawyers, which offer consumer discounts on profes-
sional services was inconsistent with the rule in article 19 of the 
professional code of conduct concerning the securing of clients.
54 Judgment No. 4614 of the Council of State of 3 october 2017; https://www.giustizia-amminis-
trativa.it.
55 The italian Competition authority, i748 – Condotte restrittive del CNF, decision No. 25154 of 22 
december 2014, http://www.agcm.it. 
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There therefore seems little scope for the National Bar Council to protect 
lawyers’ fee rates, since it is now a given that a regulation on rates adopted 
by a professional governing body is to be regarded as a decision adopted by 
an association of undertakings within the meaning of article 101 tFEU. 
The italian Competition authority has not examined in depth whether 
effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of public inter-
est objectives, as is required by the rulings in Wouters, Cipolla and CHEZ 
Elektro Bulgaria.
as for the measures introduced by the italian State, law No. 81 of 22 
May 201756 (known as the “Jobs act for Self-Employed Workers”) extended 
to professionals the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence (article 
9 of law No. 192 of 18 June 1998), providing that abusive clauses are null 
and void, and also providing for preventive and reparative protection.57 
This will apply, for example, to clauses which allow the purchaser of ser-
vices the right to unilaterally alter the terms of the contract or to withdraw 
from the contract without giving reasonable notice, or which set payment 
terms over 60 days. But the rules are also significant as regards the delicate 
question of determining what payment is due, inasmuch as self-employed 
persons who are economically dependent on a purchaser of services must 
nevertheless be ensured “fair remuneration”, to be fixed by the courts, 
which will refer, first of all, to any existing professional rates and then to 
custom and ultimately equity.
Falling within this area of protection would undoubtedly be situations 
in which a self-employed person has just a single client, as may also be 
situations in which there is a limited number of purchasers of the ser-
vices offered, especially if there is reorganisation of work arrangements or 
adjustment of specialisations, to adapt to the specific requirements of that 
clientele.
This brings us on to the type of contractual relationship between mem-
bers of some categories of intellectual professions, such as lawyers, and 
“powerful clients”, such as banks, insurance companies, and large busi-
nesses, which is a relationship that represents for the self-employed profes-
sional the sole, or the principle source of income.
56 Official Journal of the Italian Republic, no. 135 of 13 June 2017.
57 See Pietro Paolo Ferraro, “il divieto di abuso di dipendenza economica del professionista”, 
Gazzetta Forense, no. 5 (2017), 928. 
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However, these protective rules have limits and apply only where the 
lawyer, or another professional, finds himself in a situation of economic 
dependency on his client.
Furthermore, law No. 172 of 4 November 2017,58 converting decree-
law No. 148 of 16 october 2017, and law No. 205 of 27 december 201759 
guarantee fair remuneration for professionals in dealings with a broader 
spectrum of persons which fall within the scope of the rules on abuse 
of economic dependency, including agreements drafted unilaterally not 
only by banks and insurance companies, but also by undertakings not 
falling within the categories of micro-enterprises or SMEs, as defined by 
Commission recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003.
it may be added that fair remuneration is that which is proportional to 
the amount and quality of the work done, as well as to the content and 
characteristics of the legal supply, account being taken of the parameters 
laid down in the decree of the Minister of Justice adopted in accordance 
with article 13(6) of law No. 247 of 31 december 2012. That innovation, 
which introduced a new article 13a into law No. 247 of 31 december 2012, 
essentially extends to professionals the protective rules on unfair con-
tract terms, irrespective of economic dependency, and applies to public 
authorities.
in substance, the rules in question introduce a general principle accord-
ing to which contractual terms between professional and client which fix 
remuneration at a level below the values set in the parameters identified 
in the ministerial decrees would be unfair and thus null and void. That 
relative nullity may be argued by the professional and is not subject to any 
limitation period.60 it is also a partial nullity, inasmuch as the remaining 
clauses of the agreement with the “powerful client”, other than the contra 
legem clause, will remain valid. Where a court declares the clause null and 
void, it will determine the remuneration of the professional on the basis 
of the parameters set out in the ministerial regulations. This is one of the 
problematic areas of the new rules, but the reasoning behind it was the 
need to provide courts with a point of reference for fixing fair remunera-
tion, even if a less rigid, more flexible system would have been preferable.
58 Official Journal of the Italian Republic, no. 284 of 5 december 2017.
59 Official Journal of the Italian Republic, no. 302 of 29 december 2017.
60 law No. 172/2017 provided that the “nullity must be put forward within 24 months of the sign-
ing of the agreement”, but that provision was subsequently repealed by law No. 205/2017. 
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5. Conclusion
in conclusion, there are some grey areas in the new rules introduced into 
the italian legal system, even though their aim is the protection of fair 
remuneration for professionals and the prevention of abusive conduct.
The most worrying aspects in competition terms are connected with the 
rules on payments, because the new article 13a of law No. 247/2012 could 
re-introduce de facto minimum fees.
The report explaining the new rules states that the rules were necessary 
in order to provide a better balance in contractual relationships between 
professionals and economically powerful entities, as well as to ensure that 
potentially distorted competition resulting from abusive conduct on the 
part of such powerful entities and the extremely large number of lawyers 
practising in italy does not lead to the offering of discounted professional 
services, with the attendant risk of deteriorating quality.61
However, in the opinion of the italian Competition authority, in so far 
as they link the fairness of remuneration to the fee parameters contained 
in the ministerial decrees, the new rules actually reintroduce minimum 
rates, and thus impede price competition between professionals in their 
commercial dealings with this type of client.62 in particular, the authority 
has pointed out to the legislature that, with the entry into force of the rules 
on fair remuneration, it is highly unlikely that clients will agree to the fix-
ing of remuneration below the levels stipulated and thus assume the risk 
of being accused, immediately or subsequently, of not having observed the 
principle of equity. The authority has also stated that its negative stance on 
the rules on fair remuneration is not called into question by the judgment 
in Eurosaneamientos, since, in that judgment, the Court did not rule on 
61 See the website of the italian Parliament: http://www.parlamento.it/home.
62 italian Competition authority, aS1452 of 24 November 2017, Misure contenute nel testo di con-
versione del Decreto legge 148/2017 (“decreto Fiscale”). The italian Competition authority has 
always taken a negative stance on mandatory lawyers’ fees, stating that such fees are not necessary 
for attaining public interest objectives, are not appropriate to ensuring quality of service and may 
result in a competitive disadvantage for lawyers by comparison with operators who have greater 
freedom to adjust the characteristics, including price characteristics, of their supply to those of 
the demand for their services (italian Competition authority, L’indagine conoscitiva su Ordini e 
Collegi professionali, 9 october 1997, http://www.agcm.it.). The authority’s investigation predates 
the various initiatives taken by the European Commission in the area of professional services. 
See Sergio Maria Carbone and Francesco Munari, “l’indagine conoscitiva dell’autorità Garante 
della concorrenza e del mercato sugli ordini e collegi professionali ed il suo possibile impatto 
sull’avvocatura”, Concorrenza e Mercato, 1995, Milan, 411.
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the question whether the national rules were justified by a public interest 
objective, nor did it apply the test of proportionality to the rules.
in practice, the criticism of new article 13a of law No. 247/2012 is the 
same as the criticism that was made by the Competition authority against 
the decisions adopted previously by the National Bar Council, not to men-
tion the fact that this is a legislative act adopted by the italian State (rather 
than a professional governing body) or that it applies only to certain cat-
egories of clients (“powerful clients” and public authorities).
Notification is one of the so-called weak powers of the Competition 
authority.63 it has no binding effect on the legislature, which will not have 
to remove the rules introduced for the protection of fair remuneration. 
Nevertheless, we cannot say that the question of fair remuneration has 
been resolved, since the new provisions on fair remuneration could still be 
called into question from the point of view of their consistency with the 
freedom to provide services, in accordance with the Court of Justice’s rul-
ing in Cipolla (but not in Eurosaneamientos). 
although Member States are free to lay down the conditions for practis-
ing the legal profession,  their scope for manoeuvre is, however, circum-
scribed by European Union law. indeed, EU law requires verification of 
the general context in which rules have been adopted and in which they 
produce effects, as well as verification of whether any restrictions intro-
duced are necessary and proportionate to the attainment of a legitimate 
public interest objective. at the same time, it will be necessary to consider 
whether the legal profession should be distinguished from other profes-
sions, given that the rules on fair remuneration have been extended to 
all professions, including those which require registration with bars and 
associations and those which are not regulated. Therefore, the fate of fair 
remuneration hangs in the balance.64
Bibliography
amorese, Marco. “Cases C-94/04, Cippola & Macrino: The emergence of a political 
approach to the regulation of professionals in Europe?”. The Columbia Journal of 
European Law, 2007, 733-745.
63 See article 21 of law No. 287 of 10 october 1990, entitled “Powers to notify Parliament and the 
Government” (Official Journal of the Italian Republic, no. 240 of 13 october 1990). 
64 in accordance with article 15(7) of directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, 
law No. 172/2017 should be notified to the European Commission, which as we know is pressing 
for deregulation of professional fee rates far more keenly than is the Court of Justice.
M&Clr_ii_1.indd   95 26/04/2018   10:03:47
96  Market and Competition Law Review / volume ii / no. 1 / april 2018 / 75-97
Bastianon, Stefano. “due pronunce, tanti problemi, nessuna soluzione: ovvero 
gli avvocati e l’antitrust secondo la Corte di giustizia”. Il Foro Italiano, 2002, iV, 
188-197.
Carbone, Sergio Maria and Munari Francesco. “l’indagine conoscitiva dell’autorità 
Garante della concorrenza e del mercato sugli ordini e collegi professionali ed il suo 
possibile impatto sull’avvocatura”. Concorrenza e Mercato, 1995, Milano, 411-448.
decocq, Georges. “la législation espagnole relative aux honoraires des avoués n’est 
pas contraire à la prohibition des ententes”. Revue de Jurisprudence Commerciale, 
2017, 49-54.
Ehlermann, Claus-dieter. “Concurrence et profession libérales: antagonisme ou 
compatibilité?”. Revue Marché Commun, 1993, 136-144.
Ferraro, Fabio. L’Avvocato Comunitario. Naples, 2005. 
Ferraro, Pietro Paolo. “il divieto di abuso di dipendenza economica del professioni-
sta”. Gazzetta Forense, 2017, no. 5, 928-936.
Frese, Michael J. and Herman J. van Harten. “How extravagant the fees of counsellors 
at law sometimes appear, competition law and internal market constraints to fixed 
remuneration schemes”. Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2007, 393-405.
Gilliams, Hans. “Competition law and public interest: do we need to change the 
law for the (liberal) professions?”. in European Competition Law Annual 2004: 
The Relationship between Competition Law and the (Liberal) Professions, edited by 
Claus-dieter Ehlermann and isabela atanasiu. oxford: Hart, 2006.
illmer, Martin. “lawyers’ Fees and access to Justice – the Cipolla and Macrino judg-
ment of the ECJ (Joined Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04)”. Civil Justice Quarterly, 2007, 
301-309.
loozen, Edith. “Professional ethics and restraints of competition”. European Law 
Review, 2006, 28-47.
Manzini, Pietro. “i parafernali del giudizio antitrust: regola della ragionevolezza, 
restrizioni accessorie, divieto ‘per se”’. Giurisprudenza Commerciale ii (2003), 
285-296.
Monti, Mario. “Competition in professional services: New lights and new challenges”. 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_070_en.pdf.
Nascimbene, Bruno. “tariffe professionali e norme sulla concorrenza fra giudice 
comunitario e giudice nazionale”. Contratto Impresa/Europa, 1997, 482-497.
Nyssens, Harold, “Concurrence et ordre professionnels; les trompettes de Jéricho 
sonnent-elles?”. Revue de Droit Commercial Belge, 1999, 475-489.
o’loughlin, rosemary. “EC competition rules and free movement rules: an examina-
tion of the parallels and their furtherance by the ECJ Wouters decision”. European 
Competition Law Review, 2003, 62-69.
M&Clr_ii_1.indd   96 26/04/2018   10:03:47
97Unresolved Questions Regarding Lawyers’ Fees and the Restriction of Competition | Fabio Ferraro
rodríguez rodrigo, Juliana. “aplicación del derecho de la competencia a los baremos 
de honorarios de abogados: arduino y Cipolla”. La Unión Europea ante el Derecho 
de la Globalización, 2008, 433-468.
Scarselli, Giuliano. “il compenso professionale tra decoro e libera professione”. Il Foro 
Italiano, 2012, 374-377. 
Scassellati, Sforzolini Giuseppe, rizza Cesare. “la tensione fra regole di concorrenza 
comunitarie e regole professionali e deontologiche nazionali”. Giurisprudenza 
Commerciale, 2003, 8-40.
Siragusa, Mario. “Critical remarks on the Commission’s legal analysis in its report 
on Competition in Professional Services”. in European Competition Law Annual 
2004: The Relationship between Competition Law and the (Liberal) Professions, 
edited by Claus-dieter Ehlermann and isabela atanasiu. oxford: 2006, 583-590.
Vossestein, adrian J. “Case C-35/99,  arduino, Judgment of 19 February 2000, Full 
Court; Case C-309/99, Wouters et al. v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde 
van Advocaten, Judgment of 19 February 2002, Full Court”. Common Market Law 
Review, 2002, 841-863.
Wendt, ida E. “EU Competition law and liberal professions: an uneasy relationship?”. 
leiden: Martinus Niijoff Publishers, 2012.
M&Clr_ii_1.indd   97 26/04/2018   10:03:47
